LANGUAGE AND UNDERSTANDING.
INTRODUCTION
Many
considerations on the relationship between knowledge and understanding tend to,
first of all, grapple with the question of which has priority, which comes
first - knowledge or understanding? Pondering on this, other questions
eventuate: at what time can we say we know? When can we say we understand? It
seems that we must understand certain things in order to know and for us to
understand, we certainly must know something. According to Richard Mason, “It
is easy enough to set up a debate over the priority of knowledge and
understanding. On the one side, what you know must come first. What you
understand can be seen as part of what you know. More radically, you can always
ask: What do I need to know in order to understand? On the other side, you have
to understand knowledge before considering what you know.”1 Furthermore, one
can contend that to know an argument, for instance, is not the same thing as to
understand the argument. To know the argument might simply mean that one
recognizes the argument or is acquainted with it, while to understand it goes
beyond mere recognition or acquaintance.2 However, from the point
of view of epistemology, one cannot claim one understands an argument unless
one knows the argument in a way that transcends mere recognition or
acquaintance. Thus, there appears to be
a mutual containment between knowledge and understanding. Our quest here will
not be to give “the” answer to the above questions but to attempt to elicit
what it means to know and to understand. Then, the relationship between
knowledge and understanding will be considered within the framework of
cross-cultural understanding.
Certain presuppositions are often
present when any inquiry into understanding is made. There is usually the
attempt to relate understanding to interpersonal dialogues while other things
like literature, texts and artworks are left out. Although we are going to give
prominence to language and linguistic comprehension in this work, we shall
nevertheless proceed by way of exploring epistemology, as theory of knowledge
and hermeneutics, as theory of interpretation which aids understanding. This
methodology will enable us to reflect on the idea of cross-cultural
understanding. In attending to cross-cultural understanding, we note the fact
of culture with reference to its possibility only within time and space. By
space, we mean the geographical location of any given culture. Time on the
other hand, relates to culture across ages - the culture of the present and the
culture of the past.
KNOWLEDGE
In
Plato’s Theatetus, we find a classic attempt at defining knowledge. In
this work, knowledge was variously defined as perception, as true
belief, and then finally as true belief with an account. Perception
however cannot be knowledge because as Plato himself observed, if it were, then
knowledge would be relative since we do not all perceive the same way.
Furthermore, sense perceptions may sometimes be deceptive, as in the case of a
mirage or a straight stick that appears bent when immersed in water. As Plato
also observed, true belief cannot count as knowledge because, then, it will not
be possible to know a false belief. Consequently, it is the last definition
that has come down to us as the traditional account of knowledge - knowledge as
justified true belief. Thus, according to the traditional account of knowledge:
X knows Y, if,
i. Y is true
ii. X believes Y
iii. X is justified in believing that Y
Even
though the traditional account of knowledge has since it was offered in the Theatetus,
attracted a large number of followers, it is not without its problems. In fact,
the parties engaged in the dialogue in the Theatetus did not actually
conclude that justified true belief offers an account of knowledge. In 1963,
Edmund Gettier in his “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”3 called into
question the traditional account of knowledge as justified true belief. The
nucleus of Gettier’s argument was that the triad, justification, truth
and, belief, does not constitute a sufficient condition for the
postulation of knowledge. He evinces this point by demonstrating, with two
hypothetical cases, that it is possible for the three conditions to be present
and (yet) for knowledge to be lacking. In Gettier’s view, the three conditions
are necessary but not sufficient for postulating knowledge. Since the
publication of Gettier’s paper, many philosophers have tried to either
strengthen the traditional account of knowledge by adding a fourth condition or
to analyze the traditional account in order to reveal ways in which it is not
susceptible to Gettier’s counter examples. An analysis of the polemics that
surround Gettier’s position is beyond the boundaries of this work. Our intent
in this section is to simply expose what philosophers engage when they
discourse propositional knowledge.
In analyzing the traditional account
of knowledge, that is, stating the necessary and sufficient conditions that
make is possible for one to claim one has propositional knowledge, the three
constitutive parts of the definition are considered. Although Matthias Steup
believes that the idea of truth does not pose much problem because we cannot
know what is false4, there is certainly no universal agreement on what
constitutes truth. However, there is certainly a fairly general notion that one
cannot know what is false. Thus, truth is necessary for knowledge, and as we
shall point out later, it is also necessary for understanding. One cannot claim
to have understood that which is false. Belief as a condition for knowledge
seems pretty obvious. We can hardly claim to know what we do not believe. We
need to believe that what we claim to know is the case otherwise we will be
making a lucky guess. Thus, the belief condition does not generate much
controversy in discourse on epistemology. A lucky guess, for instance, would
not qualify as knowledge without belief because the one who guesses cannot be
said to possess knowledge. It is when it comes to offering the reason why we
hold a belief to be true that controversies arise. The topic of epistemic
justification has no doubt occupied a great deal of contemporary discourse in
epistemology.
What is it that justifies our true
belief such that we can claim to have knowledge? Before we attend to this
question, it is pertinent to note that once we ask the question whether we can
know with certainty (truth is about certainty), we are allowing the possibility
that we cannot know with certainty. In fact, it is the case that much of
epistemology has been driven by the goal to meet the sceptic challenge that we
cannot know with certainty. The pertinence of this to our present goal is that
if, for instance, we cannot know with certainty, can there be then, the
possibility of cross-cultural understanding? Can we ever claim that we have attained
knowledge of a culture that is different from our own such that we can contend
that we have understood that culture? Can we even claim that it is possible to
know a culture or at least aspects of a culture? Perhaps if we are able to
ascertain what it is for a true belief to be justified, we can hold the
possibility of not only knowing a culture but also, of understanding a culture.
Although this is contestable, most
theories of epistemic justification would either be internalist or externalist.
As a result, without going into the details of the different theories of
epistemic justification, we shall briefly ponder on the internalist and
externalist theories of epistemic justification. According to George Pappas,
internalism as it relates to epistemic justification, “. . . holds that a
person either does or can have a form of access to the basis for
knowledge or justified belief. The key idea is that the person either is or can
be aware of this basis.”5 So, internalists, in this sense, hold
that the knowing subject is or can be internally aware of the basis for the
knowledge or justified belief the subject holds. In addition to being aware of
this basis, that is the reason that justifies the true belief, the knowing
subject also has or can have access to this basis. Thus, for internalists, two
actions are necessary for internal justification, awareness of the basis for
the knowledge claim and access to that basis - awareness and accessibility.
Justification is therefore, determined by factors that are internal to the
knowing subject.6
Externalists, by contrast, deny that
the knowing subject can always have the sort of access to the basis for the
subject’s knowledge and justified belief, that internalists talk about. They
maintain that, “. . . the facts that determine a belief’s justification include
external facts such as whether the belief is caused by the state of affairs
that makes the belief true, whether the belief is counterfactually dependent on
the states of affairs that makes it true, whether the belief is produced by a
reliable belief producing process, or whether the belief is objectively likely
to be true.”7 As is deducible from the foregoing, the internalist -
externalist debate regarding justification revolves basically around the
question of whether what justifies our belief is internal or external.
Internalist often claim that if we are not internally convinced of our beliefs,
we cannot claim to have knowledge.
Externalists on the other hand, claim that as long as our claim to
knowledge corresponds to an external state of affairs, that claim is tenable.
Without prying deep into the
intricacies of the debate, it is germane to the overall aim of this work to
point out that with regard to the role of knowledge in understanding, what
justifies our beliefs is important. To claim that we have an understanding of a
phenomenon, do we have to be internally aware, perhaps by way of rational
reconstruction, that we have understood that phenomenon and also have access to
the basis of our understanding? Or is it the case that our claim would have to
correspond to external state of affairs? At this point, an examination of the
notion of understanding becomes imperative.
UNDERSTANDING
It
would appear that any attempt at formulating a theory of understanding would be
undermined if we undertake to start off by defining understanding. We may not
be able to give a definition of understanding in terms of necessary and
sufficient conditions. This is because whatever definition that is proffered
will most likely employ the word or the notion of understanding. Hence, we may
find ourselves in a situation whereby we end up begging the question.8
However, since defining a thing is not the only way the thing can be explained,
a description of what it means to understand may be a less ambitious and
perhaps, a more successful task to embark on. In the common ordinary usage of
understanding, there is sometimes an associated expression of scepticism about
whether we truly have understood a particular point or issue. Occasionally, we
affirm that we understand but at the same time, doubt within ourselves whether
what we claim to understand is the truth. This indicates that at any point in
the act of consciousness, the mind does the triple act of interpreting,
attempting to understand and judging whether it has truly understood. Truth
therefore is factored in within the process of understanding. Is what we
understand true to the communicated intent? Understanding and knowledge
obviously form a confluence in the domain of truth.
In order to have a good grasp of the
idea of understanding and especially cross-cultural understanding, we will
consider the notion of understanding under the auspices of the works of
Friedrich Schleiermacher, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Innocent Asouzu.
Schleiermacher
on Understanding
Many
presuppositions underlie Schleiermacher’s idea of understanding. Firstly, he
holds that the object of understanding is language. Secondly, as quoted by Jean
Grodin in his book, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics, “every
act of understanding is the universe of an act of speech, in that the thought
underlying the speech must enter consciousness.”9 The third assumption is that “all speech
depends on an earlier thought.”10
It becomes clear from the above
assumptions of Schleiermacher that language is the vehicle of thought and
understanding involves getting into thought through language. This is to say
that the basic task of understanding undoubtedly consists in tracing an
expression back to the intent that animates it. It follows therefore that
understanding is the reaching towards and grasping of the very thought that the
speaker wants to express. In the act of understanding, what the interpreter
does is to attempt to attain and ascertain the meaning of the speech or utterance
of the ‘speech-maker,’ that is, the expression or thought of the speaker. This
meaning of the expression or thought of the speaker is borne by language. This
makes language the very vehicle of understanding. This means that for us to
understand the thought or expression of the next person, we must approach it
through language.
Accordingly, Schleiermacher guides us
to view language in two ways; a. the grammatical aspect, and b.
the technical or psychological aspect. On the grammatical side, understanding
an utterance involves the following of rules and patterns of usage. This
includes syntactical coherence and contextual belonginess. In this aspect of
language, all expressions are supra-individual. This means that it goes beyond
the individual sphere. However, expression is not exclusively the carrier or
bearer of certain fundamentally supra-individual language. Language also
carries, within the expression, the exposure or disencapsulation of the
individual mind. Many people utter the same words with different meanings. Or
as Grodin explains, “People do not always mean the same thing by the same
words. If they did, there would be ‘only grammar’.”11 The second aspect
of understanding is what Schleiermacher referred to as the technical or
psychological side. Here, the syntactical aspect of language must be superseded
by what the expression really intends to relay. In the words of Grodin, “The
end and purpose is to understand a mind that discloses itself, a soul that
manifests itself through the language that it brings forth from within it.”12
In looking at the binary approach of
Schleiermacher to understanding, ascendancy is given to the psychological over
the grammatical aspect. This orientation admonishes understanding to pierce
through the purely grammatical level and enter into the spirit of the word.
Knowing the difficulty of this psychologizing of understanding, Schleiermacher
states that interpretative ‘divination’ is unavoidable. By divination, he does
not mean any spiritual act but the ordinary process of guessing. This idea
comes up because of the maxim which was adopted by Schleienmacher himself that
the task of understanding consists in understanding the discourse first as well
as and then better than the author. This idea has been viewed as being too
ideal because it involves an “infinite task”. This means we must continually
and endlessly try to enter the discourse afresh. The implication of this is the
impossibility of complete understanding. Consequently, we must always guess
what the author is trying to say.
Many
scholars who accused Schleiermacher of psychologizing understanding might as
well be reminded of the dialectical or dialogical horizon of Schleiermacher’s theory of understanding. By
dialectic, he means the art of mutual understanding. Such need arose when he
conceived that “perfect knowledge” is unattainable, owing to human finitude. He
posits that we do not need to gainsay the fact that the sphere of thought
presents endless matter of debate. About this Grondin asserts:
Thus we always remain dependent on conversations with
one another – and with ourselves – in order to arrive at sharable truths that
for the moment are no longer the object of debate. This dialectical impulse,
which arises once the attempt to find ultimate foundation has been
abandoned...the individual, intrinsically disposed to error, achieves knowledge
only through conversation and sharing thoughts with others.13
This
final submission of Schleiermacher smacks of an air of pragmatism. It,
therefore, seems that the ultimate understanding which can give us perfect
knowledge is a fantasy, hence a need to share thoughts with one another on
mutual grounds. One might be tempted to assert that Schleiermacher despaired
and compromised his pursuit of unravelling the crux of what it means to
understand, replacing it instead, with certain traits of pragmatism.
Nevertheless, he made a great contribution to the notion of understanding by
pointing out language as a vehicle of understanding.
Gadamer
on the role of Tradition and Language in Understanding
We begin our engagement of Hans-Gorg
Gadamer’s conception of understanding from his rejection of method in the
humanistic sciences. For him, the human sciences have no method of their own.14
He embarked on this rejection in order to accommodate the play of prejudices or
what he called the “fore-understanding” in understanding. In relation to this,
Jean Grondin averred that “according to Gadamer, historicism’s delusion
consisted in trying to displace our prejudices with methods in order to make
something like certainty and objectivity possible in the human sciences.”15
Historicism as conceived here believes and holds that every doctrine can be
understood only against the backdrop of its time.
In trying to buttress his view on the
foregoing, Gadamer states that man is historically situated. He further affirms
that we (humans) are historically effected consciousness. For him “history
interpenetrates our ‘substance’ in such a way that we cannot ultimately clarify
it or distance ourselves form it.”16 This is to say that it is
our history or tradition that determines the background of our values,
cognitions, our critical judgements and even our understanding in general.
“That is why”, according to Gadamer, “the prejudices of the individual, far
more than his judgements, constitute the historical reality of his being.”17
Thus, he holds that any being which thinks according to the fashion of
tradition is a historical being, and this is what all humans are. Understanding
involves our history and our traditions. Gadamer asserts that every society has
its tradition and this societal tradition is a form of authority. Tradition
here means that unspoken, unwritten way in which people have been and/or still
are, which is continually “affirmed, embraced and cultivated.”18
This refers to the general behaviour of the people; how they think; whether or
not they are aware. In understanding, one brings with him or her this tradition
and it is built in as a component of what we project – the “fore-conception of
completeness.”
The above is simply an averment that
we must have something in mind if we are to understand at all. Gadamer states
that we have “fore-conception of completeness.” This means the projection of
meaning for the text as a whole once an initial meaning emerges in the text.19
What Gadamer tries to explain here is that our tradition gives us a way of
perceiving, an initial meaning which we project as the fore-conception of
completeness, and the understanding which allows us to further understand. In
this regard, tradition (our history) is that through which we see, it is the
spectacle and filter through which the world is disclosed to us as our world.
In accordance with the foregoing,
Gadamer posits that historically effected consciousness fuse horizons of the
past. By horizon he means “the range of vision that includes everything that
can be seen from a particular vintage point.”20 However, the horizon is the product of
tradition and can be viewed as the traditional standpoint. Understanding, therefore,
actuates or occurs from within a particular horizon which is however,
determined by our historically-determined situatedness.21
Besides, the horizon is always at risk of change and this is not to be avoided.
It is put up in dialogue or conversation with its partner in such a way that
the process of understanding becomes an “agreement” upon the matter at issue.
This agreement is an establishment of a common framework or horizon. Gadamer
calls this “fusion of horizons”. And for him, understanding is the process of
fusing horizons. On this Jeff Malpas submits that,
Inasmuch as understanding is taken to involve a
‘fusion of horizons’, then so it always involves the formation of a new context
of meaning that enables integration of what is otherwise unfamiliar, strange or
anomalous. In this respect, all understanding involves a process of mediation
and dialogue between what is familiar and what is alien in which neither
remains unaffected.22
Hence, understanding is an agreement
that results through language in the course of conversation or dialogue. This
is what Gadamer means when he states that understanding is linguistically
mediated. That is, for him, the medium to be used to convey meanings and have a
conversation or dialogue must be language and this language emanates from the
tradition of the interpreter. To have a language is to have a tradition, for
language is the oral tradition or the verbal presentation of tradition.
According to this position, to have a language is to have a world-view. This means
that there are as many world-views as there are languages. And for one to have
any view of the world, it is necessary to experience the world. But we
experience the world from the point of view of our tradition and our language.
However, it is through language that our world is “disclosed”.23
In the final analysis, Gadamer asserts
that understanding is attended by the projection of the prejudices, the
fore-conception of completeness and the fore-judgments of the interpreter which
is informed by his or her historical and traditional situatedness which opens
it up to conversation or dialogue. This dialogue is made possible by language.
The result is understanding – the agreement through conversation or the fusion
of horizons.
THE PROBLEM OF UNDERSTANDING ACROSS CULTURES
The
problem of understanding, which has as its object, meaning of linguistic
symbols and expressions, revolves essentially around translation and
interpretation. There is a relationship between understanding and, translation
and interpretation. Gadamer in fact claims that understanding and
interpretation are ultimately the same thing and that every translator is an
interpreter.24 Thus, the
problem of understanding embodies the concomitant problems of translation and
interpretation as intrinsic components. On the question of cross-cultural
understanding, Aigbodioh and Igbafen assert that, “In its simplest connotation,
translation problem has to do with the question: How can we retain the meaning
of a statement, expression or concept undistorted when translation from one
language into another language and vice-versa?”25 W. V .O. Quine,
pondering on this question relates that,
In translating a foreign language to our own,
there is the possibility of reading our own provincial needs into the alien
speech. In fact, this is natural. Some philosophers have argued that deep
differences of language carry with them ultimate differences in the way one
thinks of looks upon the world.26
Here,
Quine raises the problem of indeterminacy of translation from the point-of-view
of radical translation. He is effectively saying that there can be no bias free
translation. Consequently, there can be no bias free interpretation and so, our
understanding of another culture will inevitably be coloured by our own
cultural idiosyncrasies. And this will not be limited to language but will also
cut across arts and other aspects of culture. From a Quinian standpoint, the
fusion of horizons would hardly eliminate a prejudiced understanding. Of
course, Gadamer will not balk at this.
Olusegun
Oladipo highlighted the problem of translation in the study of African
Philosophy when he observed that,
By taking translation for granted and assuming that
sameness of meaning between two linguistic expressions can be established in
terms of sameness of referent, scholars who promote this orientation in the
study of African traditional thought systems fall into a linguistic trap. This
trap make them superimpose alien conceptual categories on these thought systems
thereby distorting them.27
A
European who sees soul translated as emi in Yoruba language might
go away with the impression that she has understood that soul means emi
among the Yorubas. However, a careful analysis of both words - soul and
emi - and their cultural implications will reveal that both words can
hardly be understood as translating each other without some heavy dose of
qualification. In fact, as Oladipo observed, such a translation for the sake of
explaining another culture might actually become hegemonic. In his ethnological
consideration of the Neur people, Levy-Bruhl adjudged Africans as pre-logical.
According to him, African thought systems admitted of contradictions and
Africans hold these contradictions all together. Evans Pritchard disagreed with
this position of Levy-Bruhl. Pritchard claimed Levy-Bruhl’s assertion was based
on lack of understanding of the African people. Accordingly he writes;
It seems odd, if not absurd to a European when he
is told that a twin is like a bird, but that he is a bird. There seems to be a
complete contradiction in the statement: and it was precisely on statements
like this kind recorded by observers of primitive people that Levy-Bruhl based
his theory of pre-logical mentality of these peoples, its chief characteristic
being in his view, that it permits such evident contradiction in that a thing
can be what it is and at the same time something altogether different.28
The
problem of understanding as shown in the above reflections points to its root
as the intrinsic intimacy between language and culture. It then seems that to
understand a certain language, some cultural categories imbued in the language
must be grappled with. How then, is it possible for us to make out meaning or
understand each other in a multilingual society?
LANGUAGE,
BIOLOGY, ASPECTS OF CULTURE AND CROSS-CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING
There is no gainsaying the fact that
among the most important roles that language plays in a society is that of
enhancing and strengthening bonds among those using a common language.29
Lack of common language affects the quality of interpersonal relationship in
somewhat negative ways. Such effects manifest in forms of lack of bond of
unity, controversies or conflicts, lack of communal integrity, semantic
disagreement and discordant understanding.
However, we note that one of the main
aims of communication is mutual understanding and in this process of
understanding, language plays a major role.30 However, there are
various instances of people sharing common language without a resultant unity,
cohesion and understanding. This raises the question of the degree of the role
of extra-linguistic factors in the process of
understanding, especially cross-culturally. The question is important
since sometimes, we find people who do not have a common language but who
cohere, unite, and share other common bonds and identities. How then is it possible to have
cross-cultural understanding. How do we understand the other? Innocent Asouzu opines that certain meanings
and intentions lie behind the use of words. According to this understanding,
language plays a central role in the understanding of meaning, but the
communication of meaning transcends the fact of sharing a common language. To
buttress this point, he posits that;
...the logic underlying the operations of
pluralistic societies is based on the latent meanings and interests that are
communicated in situations of discourse...The critical function of language
lies in its ability to unify the content of consciousness in a manner that
transcends the individual’s subjective perception of the world.31
This
frame of argument is what, from hindsight, enabled Asouzu to situate what gives
substance to cross-cultural understanding. Though he hallowed meaning and
interest as factors that participate in understanding, he further asserts that;
Whenever our subjective world becomes intelligible
to others, this presupposes a certain level of mutually shared experience based
on a common fundamental logical model and a primal communicative ability. Most
common acts or capacities of the mind as these become evident in the ability to
predicate, to quantify, to connect sentences, to assert, to negate, to
prescribe, to exclaim, to judge etc. follow from these two fundamental
preconditions and predispositions.32
The
line of Asouzu’s arguments immediately point to the reality of human
rationality (that is the logical model) and certain innate linguistic ability (
a primal communicative ability). On rationality, this research unravels that
all humans share identity of rationality and are therefore penetrable through
this medium in the act of understanding, especially across cultures.
Rationality cuts across cultures and transcends tradition and culture. Through
the means and aid of human rationality, humans can engage in rational
conversation, and dialogue. This way, they understand both meaning and message
(the symbolic import) communicated through language.33
Another window into cross-cultural
understanding is the primal communicative ability. This evokes Noam Chomsky’s
idea of nativism which is centred on innatism. Within this frame, Chomsky tends
to grant the possibility of cross-cultural understanding on the grounds of the
“language acquisition device.” While arguing that the “language acquisition
device” is species specific, he spreads and limits it to humans. If this
language acquisition device is predicable of all human beings, then it can
grant or render possible insight into
varying cultures in understanding. If we add to this, the “principle of
charity” of Donald Davidson - introduced seemingly to rescue us from the mire
of Quine’s linguistic relativism - cross cultural understanding becomes more
attainable. The “principle of charity”
is predicated upon such assumptions, as depicted by Dipo Irele, that “ the
language of others makes sense and does not differ radically from any other
and, therefore, that the generalized principles, which are operative in our own
language also work for the language we want to translate.”34
Cross cultural understanding is also
conceived as possible when viewed from the standpoint of Gadamer’s “fusion of
horizons.” About fusion of horizons Gadamer, among other things, relates that,
This means that the interpreter’s own thoughts
have also gone into the re-awakening of the meaning of the text. In this the
interpreter’s own horizon is decisive, yet not as a personal standpoint that
one holds on to or enforces, but more as a meaning and a possibility that one
brings into play and puts at risk, and that helps one truly to make one’s own
what is said...We can now see that this is the full realisation of
conversation, in which something is express that is not only mine or my
author’s, but common.35
In
this view, we can safely assume that a common comprehension of a particular
culture can be attained when a fusion of horizons occur. Cross cultural
understanding then becomes that agreement which results from dialogue between
interacting meanings.
Thus far, our discourse seem to have
centred on language. But, language is not the only factor that makes
understanding and cross-cultural understanding possible. Whereas it is true
that, following Chomsky’s position, that we can talk about universal grammar
which makes inter-cultural understanding and communication possible, there are
other cultural universals that facilitate the understanding across cultures. We
already identified the transcendence of human rationality in our analysis of
Innocent Asouzu’s position on cross-cultural understanding. However, before
Asouzu, Kwasi Wiredu had pointed to the notion of biological unity of humankind
as a factor that makes cross-cultural communication realizable. And, it is
doubtful if there can be realistic cross-cultural communication without
cross-cultural understanding.
In his Cultural Universals and
Particulars: An African Perspective, Wiredu claims that the fact of biological similarity of humans
across cultures serves as a bridge between whatever cultural particularities or
differences there are in different cultures. In his words, “. . . the fundamental
biological similarity of all human beings assures the possibility of resolving
all such disparities [among cultures], for the foundation of all communication
is biological.”36
Thus, we identify biological similarity, Ã la Wiredu, as one
cultural factor that makes cross-cultural understanding realizable. Given this
biological similarity, one can presume that certain actions based on human biological (and psychological) constitution
are equally similar. We can therefore,
understand these actions in another culture even from the standpoint of our own
culture. Thus, cross-cultural understanding is facilitated. It is important,
however, to note that even though Wiredu spoke about biological similarity, he
nonetheless, paid attention to language in speaking about cultural universals.
He would say that,
Culture is not just the social forms and customary
beliefs and practices of a human group. These phenomena themselves depend on
the existence of language, knowledge, communication, interaction, and methods
of transmitting knowledge to the born and unborn. And this is the fundamental
sense of the word ‘culture’. In this sense, on might sum up the preceding
discussion by saying that the fact of language itself, i.e., the possession of
one language or another by all human societies, is the cultural universal par
excellence37.
If
the possession of language is the quintessential cultural universal, then we
can safely assume that language plays a central role in cross-cultural
understanding.
This notwithstanding, as we are eager
to point out, the role of facilitating cross-cultural understanding cannot be
restricted to language. Len Doyal and Roger Harris argue that there are some
‘constitutive activities’ that cut across cultures and which make substantive
cross-cultural translation achievable. According to them, these constitutive
activities include, “eating, sleeping, agricultural production, reproducing,
construction, sheltering, healing, playing, etc”38. Doyal and Harris
will further argue that, “. . . unlike culturally specific activities which are
subject to indefinite variations, constitutive activities present a constancy
which does not change with language”39. The implication of this
for cross-cultural interaction is that this interaction is not limited to or by
any restrictions that might be imposed by linguistic and translation
difficulties. Adeshina Afolayan underscores this implication when he relates
that, “the implication of [Doyal and Harris] analysis is obvious: The
constitutive activities become the ‘translation bridgehead’ which is not
language-dependent”40. This corroborates the point that
cross-cultural understanding is not absolutely linguistic dependent.
CONCLUSION
The
trajectory of this paper is one that moved from a brief exposition of what
philosophers engage when they discuss propositional knowledge, through an
examination of the notion of understanding, the problem of understanding across
cultures, to the interrogation language, biology, aspects of culture and
cross-cultural understanding. In a globalized world, communication among
cultures is inevitable. However, while there may be certain things that cut
across all cultures - the ability to ratiocinate and linguistic capability -
there are a myriad of things that distinguish cultures. In this situation and,
given that inter-cultural communication is ineluctable, getting to know and
understand a culture will not only foster peaceful co-existence but will
certainly help to eliminate destructive prejudice. Experience reveals that whenever
any culture is judged on the basis of another culture, the former culture is
found wanting in many ways. But, when a culture is judged on its own merit, a
better and a more rational judgment is achieved. A culture can however not be
judged on its own merit unless a knowledge and an eventual understanding of the
culture is attempted.
How do we begin to achieve
cross-cultural understanding? Our objective in this work has been to show how
we can hope to attain cross-cultural understanding by exploring the concepts of
knowledge and understanding. We have during the course of this work, made it
clear that knowledge is essential to understanding. Language is an important
aspect of culture and so, there has to be knowledge of the language in which a
culture is expressed if that culture has to be understood. It would not only be
rash but also manifestly arrogant for one to claim to understand a culture
whose language one does not know. Hence, we paid attention in this work to
language, to the science of interpretation - that is, hermeneutics, and to
translation. Knowledge of a language, hermeneutical engagement of a language
for interpretation and meaning and, translation for cross-cultural comparison
will certainly help one to enter into the language game of any culture. They
will also facilitate the fusion of horizons for better understanding. It is
true that in order to have a good grasp of any culture, one has to go beyond
language to also engage other aspects of the culture such as religious and
ethical beliefs, dress code, artwork, etc. It is however doubtful if these
other aspects of culture can be made intelligible without language.
Consequently, it would be correct to say that what we have engaged in our work
is basically a linguistic model of understanding. We did not, however, limit
ourselves to language. We did identify other non-linguistic factors that
equally contribute to cross-cultural understanding, from biological similarity
to the ‘constitutive activities’ found in all cultures.
We paid a greater deal of attention,
in this work, to understanding more than we did to knowledge. The reason is
simple. In intellectual discourse, the idea of knowledge is often more engaged
than the idea of understanding. Nevertheless, as we hope our work has been able
to show, knowledge and understanding are closely knit. This connection however,
has not been without problems especially within the matrix of cross-cultural
understanding. Be that as it may, our discourse here discovers very importantly
that, understanding is a process, a continuum and not strictly an accomplished
state of affairs.
This idea that understanding is a
process, a continuum, needs further clarification. Understanding, especially
given its relationship to knowledge, is not something that can always be
achieved of some phenomenon in an absolute, exhaustive sense. Like in the case
of knowledge, there seem to be always room for more understanding. Human
experience shows that even when it appears a particular phenomenon has been
known or understood completely, there is always room for further knowledge or
understanding. A simple example will suffice to illustrate. If a student learns
that 2 + 2 = 4, it would appear that an understanding of this simple arithmetic
is complete. However, when the student later learns that 2 + 2 = 4 is only
possible when the calculation is done in base 10, a further understanding is
gained.
Philosophers and scientists over the
centuries have been making efforts to understand reality. At different times,
in different ways, an understanding of a particular phenomenon in reality is
said to have been achieved. History however reveals that as time went on, a
further or perhaps, an entirely new understanding of that particular phenomenon
was still achieved. History also reveals that at the time when the previous
understanding was attained, that enabled the philosophers and scientists of
that epoch to interact effectively and productively with reality. The
importance of this second revelation from history is that it helps us to
address the issue of the sense in which we can say we understand a person, a
thing, a culture. We can claim, at a particular point in time, that we have
understood a person, a thing, a culture, when we have attained sufficient
information or knowledge of that person, thing or culture to enable us interact
effectively and productively with the person, thing or culture. But, we always
keep in mind that a further understanding that can aid better effective and
productive interaction can still be gained.
To claim that one has understood a
person, a thing or a culture in an absolute, definitive un-improvable way, is to claim that one has a grasp of the
totality of the history, present situation or conditions, and future
conditions or potentials of the person, thing or culture. It is doubtful
whether any honest philosopher or intellectual will make such a claim.
2Cf.
Walter Cerf, “‘To Know’ and ‘To Understand’” in Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Sep., 1951), p. 87. Available
online at:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2103369. Accessed: 16/09/2010
3Cf.
Edmund L. Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?” In Analysis 23 (1963):
121-123. Available online at: http://www.ditext.com/gettier/gettier.html
4See Matthias Steup, “The Analysis of Knowledge” Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available online at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/
5 George
Pappas, “Internalist vs. Externalist Conceptions of Epistemic Justification” in
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available online at:
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-intext/ Downloaded on: June 2, 2010.
6Cf. Ted Poston, “Internalism and
Externalism in Epistemology” Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Available online at: http://www.iep.utm.edu/int-ext/
9Hermeneutik
und Kritik, ed. M. Frank, p.76. Cited by Jean
Grodin, Introduction to Philosophical Hermeneutics (London: Yale
University Press, 1994), p.68.
21Cf.
Jeff Malpas, “Hans-Georg Gadamer” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Available online at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/gadamer/ Downloaded on
October 26, 2010.
25J. A.
Aigbodioh and M. L. Igbafen, Philosophy
of Language From an African Perspective (Ekpoma: A. Inno Printing Press, 2004), p.87.
27Olusegun Oladipo, “Western Concepts: The Problem of Language and
Meaning in Religio-Anthropological Interpretations of African World-Views” in
K. A. Owolabi, ed. Language in
Nigeria (Ibadan: Ibadan Group
Publishers, 1995), p.396.
29Cf
Innocent I. Asouzu, Ikwa-Ogwe:
Essential Readings in Complementary Reflection. (Calabar: Saesprint Publisher, 2007), p.159.
33Cf.
Francis Offor, “The Analytic-Synthetic Distinction in Indigenous African
Language,” Philosophy, Culture
and Traditions, Vol. 4, p.194.
Centre for Philosophy, Theology and Cultural Traditions, St Francis Xavier
University Antigonish, Canada, 2007.
34Dipo
Irele, “Philosophy of Language: A Contemporary Approach” in K. A. Owolabi, ed. Issues and Problems in Philosophy, (Ibadan: Grovacs, 2000), p.184.
36Kwasi
Wiredu, Cultural Universals and Particulars: An African Perspective
(Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1996), p. 20
38Len
Doyal and Roger Harris, “The Practical Foundations of Human Understanding,” New
Left Review, no. 139, May-June, 1983,
p.65
40Adeshina
Afolayan, “The Language Question in African Philosophy” in Olusegun Oladipo
(ed), Core Issues in African Philosophy (Ibadan: Hope Publications,
2006), p.49
Comments
Post a Comment